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On Reachable Sets of Hidden CPS Sensor Attacks
Carlos Murguia and Justin Ruths
Abstract— For given system dynamics, observer structure,
and observer-based fault/attack detection procedure, we provide
mathematical tools – in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities
(LMIs) – for computing outer ellipsoidal bounds on the set
of estimation errors that attacks can induce while maintaining
the alarm rate of the detector equal to its attack-free false
alarm rate. We refer to these sets to as hidden reachable sets.
The obtained ellipsoidal bounds on hidden reachable sets quan-
tify the attacker’s potential impact when it is constrained to
stay hidden from the detector. We provide tools for minimizing
the volume of these ellipsoidal bounds (minimizing thus the
reachable sets) by redesigning the observer gains. Simulation
results are presented to illustrate the performance of our tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been significant interest and work
in the broad area of security of cyber-physical systems
(CPS), see for example [1]-[8]. This topic investigates the
properties of conventional control systems in the presence
of adversarial disturbances. Control theory has shown great
ability to robustly deal with disturbances and uncertainties
[9]. However, adversarial attacks raise all-new issues due to
the aggressive and strategic nature of the disturbances that
attackers might inject into the system.
This paper focuses on attack detection and attack capa-
bilities in CPSs. A majority of the work on attack detec-
tion leverages the established literature of fault detection
[1],[2],[10],[11]. A fault detection approach uses an estima-
tor to forecast the evolution of the system dynamics. When
the residual (the difference between what is measured and
the estimation), or some function of the residual, is larger
than a predetermined threshold, an alarm is raised. Arguably
the most insidious attacks are those that occur without our
knowledge. Fault detectors impose limits on the attacker, if
the attacker aims to avoid being identified. Beyond retooling
these existing methods for the new attack detection context,
a fundamental question is: given a chosen fault detection
approach, how does this method constrain the influence of
an attacker? More specifically, what is an attacker able to
accomplish when a system employs certain fault detection
procedure?
Different methodologies exist for evaluating the impact
of attacks. Most of the existing work uses some measure
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of state (or state estimate) deviation. In [2], the authors
identify that if the attacker can take advantage of the zero
dynamics of a (noise-free) input-output system, it can modify
the system dynamics without reflecting its influence in the
residual variables. This type of attacks are stealthy to any
fault detector. A number of groups have studied the system
response when the attacks are constrained by the detector.
An important distinction between the collection of existing
work – and the work discussed here – is the definition of
how the attacker is constrained. We suggest the following
terminology. While the term stealthy attack is used very
broadly, we suggest that this refer to the zero-dynamics case,
as discussed in [2], because these attacks do not propagate
to the residual. Some work has investigated the case of
system response due to what we here call zero-alarm attacks,
i.e., attacks such that the detector threshold is never crossed
[12]-[16]. Because real systems (with noise) always have a
nonzero rate of false alarms raised by the detector, this attack
model yields a relatively obvious attack signature because
the alarms stop as soon as the attack starts. Other papers
identify attacks that mimic the false alarm rate, thus making
the alarm rate during the attack very close to the false alarm
rate before the attack started [17],[18]. These attacks we
call hidden attacks because although they do change the
distribution of the residual, these changes are hidden from
the way the detector evaluates the distribution. A majority of
this work uses state bounds or steady-state limits to quantify
the impact that an attacker can have. The exceptions to this
are [17],[18], which quantify the reachable set of states and
estimation errors when driven by the attack input.
This paper fuses several of these successful lines of
research with a more strict interpretation of hidden attacks.
The papers [17],[18] consider hidden attacks, however, they
permit the alarm rate to change by a small value; the attacker
capabilities that are derived are associated with this small
deviation rather than the full scope of allowable attacks.
Here, we fix the alarm rate exactly to study true hidden
attacks (i.e., alarm rate exactly equal to the false alarm
rate), and characterize the reachable sets on the estimation
error dynamics associated with this broader definition of
possible attack vectors. In this work, we characterize the
hidden reachable sets that the attacker can induce through
manipulation of sensor data. Because in general, it is quite
difficult to compute these sets exactly, for given system
dynamics and attack detection scheme, we derive ellipsoidal
bounds on the hidden reachable sets using Linear Matrix
Inequalities (LMIs) [19]. Then, we provide synthesis tools
for minimizing these bounds (minimizing thus the hidden
reachable set) by properly redesigning the detectors.
This builds off of our previous work in [18]. The strict
interpretation of hidden attacks requires more direct handling
of the effect of noise. To derive finite ellipsoidal bounds,
we introduce the notion of p-probable reachable sets, which
provides a nested set of ellipsoidal bounds based on the
probability of the driving random sequences taking certain
values. Because the derivation of the reachable set of states
from the reachable set of estimation errors is captured in [18]
(for a class of observer-based output feedback controllers),
and similar techniques can be used in this paper, we report
here only on estimation error reachable sets. Note that the
problem formulation in this paper, while seemingly similar,
requires an entirely different characterization from [18].
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & ATTACK DETECTION
We study LTI stochastic systems of the form:{
x(tk+1) = Fx(tk) +Gu(tk) + v(tk),
y(tk) = Cx(tk) + η(tk),
(1)
with sampling time-instants tk, k ∈ N, state x ∈ Rn,
measured output y ∈ Rm, control input u ∈ Rl, matrices F ,
G, and C of appropriate dimensions, and i.i.d. multivariate
zero-mean Gaussian noises v ∈ Rn and η ∈ Rm with
covariance matrices R1 ∈ Rn×n, R1 ≥ 0 and R2 ∈ Rm×m,
R2 ≥ 0, respectively. The initial state x(t1) is assumed
to be a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
R0 ∈ Rn×n, R0 ≥ 0. The processes v(tk), k ∈ N and
η(tk), k ∈ N and the initial condition x(t1) are mutually
independent. It is assumed that (F,G) is stabilizable and
(F,C) is detectable. At the time-instants tk, k ∈ N, the
output of the process y(tk) is sampled and transmitted over
a communication network. The received output y¯(tk) is used
to compute control actions u(tk) which are sent back to the
process, see Fig. 1. The complete control-loop is assumed to
be performed instantaneously, i.e., the sampling, transmis-
sion, and arrival time-instants are supposed to be equal. In
this paper, we focus on attacks on sensor measurements. That
is, in between transmission and reception of sensor data, an
attacker may replace the signals coming from the sensors
to the controller, see Fig. 1. After each transmission and
reception, the attacked output y¯ takes the form:
y¯(tk) := y(tk) + δ(tk) = Cx(tk) + η(tk) + δ(tk), (2)
where δ(tk) ∈ R
m denotes additive sensor attacks. Denote
xk := x(tk), uk := u(tk), vk := v(tk), y¯k := y¯(tk), ηk :=
η(tk), and δk := δ(tk). Using this new notation, the attacked
system is written as follows{
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk + vk,
y¯k = Cxk + ηk + δk.
(3)
A. Observer
In order to estimate the state of the process, we use the
following Luenberger observer [20]
xˆk+1 = F xˆk +Guk + L
(
y¯k − Cxˆk
)
, (4)
with estimated state xˆk ∈ Rn, xˆ1 = E[x(t1)], where E[ · ]
denotes expectation, and observer gain matrix L ∈ Rn×m.
Define the estimation error ek := xk− xˆk. Given the system
Fig. 1. Cyber-physical system under attacks on the sensor measurements.
dynamics (3) and the observer (4), the estimation error is
governed by the following difference equation
ek+1 =
(
F − LC
)
ek − Lηk − Lδk + vk. (5)
The pair (F,C) is detectable; hence, the observer gain L can
be selected such that (F − LC) is Schur. Moreover, under
detectability of (F,C), if there are no attacks (i.e., δk = 0),
where 0 denotes the zero matrix of appropriate dimensions,
the covariance matrix Pk := E[eke
T
k ] converges to steady
state in the sense that limk→∞ Pk = P exists, see [21]. For
a given L and δk = 0, it can be verified that the asymptotic
covariance matrix P = limk→∞ Pk is given by the solution
P of the following Lyapunov equation:
(F − LC)P (F − LC)T − P +R1 + LR2L
T = 0. (6)
It is assumed that the system has reached steady state before
an attack occurs.
B. Residuals and Hypothesis Testing
In this manuscript, we characterize the effect that output
injection attacks can induce in the system with being detected
by fault detection techniques. The main idea behind fault
detection theory is the use of an estimator to forecast the
evolution of the system. If the difference between what
it is measured and the estimation is larger than expected,
there may be a fault in or attack on the system. Although
the notion of residuals and model-based detectors is now
routine in the fault detection literature, the primary focus
has been on detecting and isolating failures that have known
signatures in the degradation of measurement quality, i.e.,
faults with specific structures. Now, in the context of an
intelligent adversarial attacker for which there is no known
attack signature, new challenges arise to understand the effect
that an adaptive intruder can have on the system without
being detected. In this paper, we use the linear observer
introduced in the previous section as our estimator. Define
the residual sequence rk, k ∈ N, as
rk := y¯k − Cxˆk = Cek + ηk + δk, (7)
which evolves according to the difference equation:{
ek+1 =
(
F − LC
)
ek − Lηk − Lδk + vk,
rk = Cek + ηk + δk.
(8)
If there are no attacks, the steady state mean of rk is
E[rk+1] = CE[ek+1] + E[ηk+1] = 0m×1, (9)
and its asymptotic covariance matrix is given by
Σ := E[rk+1r
T
k+1] = CPC
T +R2. (10)
It is assumed that Σ ∈ Rm×m is positive definite. For this
residual, we identify two hypotheses to be tested: H0 the
normal mode (no attacks) and H1 the faulty mode (with
faults/attacks). Then, we have
H0 :
{
E[rk] = 0m×1,
E[rkr
T
k ] = Σ,
H1 :
{
E[rk] 6= 0m×1, or
E[rkr
T
k ] 6= Σ,
where 0m×1 denotes an m-dimensional vector composed of
zeros only. In this manuscript, we use the chi-squared proce-
dure for examining the residual and subsequently detecting
attacks.
C. Distance Measure and Chi-squared Procedure
The input to any detection procedure is a distance measure
zk ∈ R, k ∈ N, i.e., a measure of how deviated the
estimator is from the sensor measurements. We employ
distance measures any time we test to distinguish between
H0 and H1. The chi-squared test uses a quadratic form
on the residual as distance measure to test for substantial
variations in mean and variance of the error between the
measured output and the estimate. Consider the residual
sequence rk , (8), and its covariance matrix Σ, (10). The chi-
squared procedure is defined as follows.
Chi-squared procedure:
If zk := r
T
k Σ
−1rk > α, k˜ = k. (11)
Design parameter: threshold α ∈ R>0.
Output: alarm time(s) k˜.
Thus, the procedure is designed so that alarms are triggered if
zk exceeds the threshold α. The normalization by Σ
−1 makes
setting the value of the threshold α system independent. This
quadratic expression leads to a sum of the squares of m
normally distributed random variables which implies that the
distance measure zk follows a chi-squared distribution with
m degrees of freedom, see, e.g., [22] for details.
D. False Alarms
The occurrence of an alarm in the chi-squared procedure
when there are no attacks to the CPS is referred to as a false
alarm. The threshold α must be selected to fulfill a desired
false alarm rate A∗. Let A ∈ [0, 1] denote the false alarm
rate of the chi-squared procedure defined as the expected
proportion of observations which are false alarms, i.e., A :=
pr[zk ≥ α], where pr[·] denotes probability, see [23] and [24].
Proposition 1 [13]. Assume that there are no attacks on
the system and consider the chi-squared procedure (11)
with residual rk ∼ N (0,Σ) and threshold α ∈ R>0. Let
α = α∗ := 2P−1(m
2
, 1 − A∗), where P−1(·, ·) denotes the
inverse regularized lower incomplete gamma function (see
[22]), then A = A∗.
III. HIDDEN REACHABLE SETS
In this section, we provide tools for quantifying (for
given L) and minimizing (by selecting L) the impact of the
attack sequence δk on the estimation error ek when the chi-
squared procedure is used for attack detection. To quantify
the effect of attacks, we need to introduce some measure
of impact. However, because malicious adversaries may
launch any arbitrary attack, we need a measure which can
capture all possible trajectories that the attacker can induce
in the estimation error dynamics, given how it accesses the
dynamics (i.e., through residual variables by tampering with
sensor measurements). We propose to use the reachable set
of the attack sequence δk as our measure of impact. We
are interested in attacks that do not change the false alarm
rate of the detector A, i.e., A¯ = A, where A¯ denotes the
alarm rate under the attacker’s action. This class of attacks
is what we refer to as hidden attacks and the trajectories
that hidden attacks can induce in the system are referred to
as hidden reachable sets. In this section, we provide tools
based on Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) for computing
outer ellipsoidal bounds on the hidden reachable sets induced
by the attack sequence δk given the system dynamics, the
chi-squared procedure, the noise, and the false alarm rate A.
A. Attack Model and Hidden Reachable Sets
We assume that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
system dynamics, the observer, measurements, and detection
procedure (chi-squared). It is further assumed that all the
sensors can be compromised by the attacker at each time
step (the case where not all the sensors are attacked is left as
future work). By considering this strong, worst-case attacker,
we are able to construct an upper bound on the abilities of
the attacker. Consider the estimation error dynamics (8), the
residual sequence rk = Cek + ηk + δk, and the distance
measure
zk = ||Σ
− 1
2 rk||
2 = ||Σ−
1
2 (Cek + ηk + δk)||
2, (12)
where Σ−
1
2 denotes the symmetric squared root matrix of
Σ−1. The set of feasible attack sequences that the opponent
can launch while satisfying A¯ = A can be written as the
following constrained control problem on δk:{
δk ∈ Rm
∣∣∣∣∣ ek satisfies (8), andpr[||Σ− 12 (Cek + ηk + δk)||2 > α ] = A,
}
, (13)
for k ∈ N. We are interested in the error trajectories that
the attacker can induce in the system restricted to satisfy
(13). Note that, as long as A¯ = A, the attacker may
induce any arbitrary random sequence δk. This and the fact
that vk and ηk are Gaussian (thus having infinite support)
imply that deterministic reachable sets induced by δk and
the noise sequences are generally unbounded. To overcome
this obstacle, we introduce the notion of p-probable hidden
reachable sets Rpα. Define ζk := Σ
− 1
2 (Cek + ηk + δk) and
note that the estimation error dynamics (8) can be written in
terms of ζk as:{
ek+1 = Fek − LΣ
1
2 ζk + vk,
ζk = Σ
−
1
2 (Cek + ηk + δk).
(14)
For given false alarm rate A and probability p ∈ (0, 1), the
p-probable hidden reachable set of the attack sequence δk in
(14), Rpα, is defined as the set of ek ∈ R
n, k ∈ N that can
be reached from the origin e1 = 0 due to the the attacker’s
action δk restricted to satisfy A¯ = A and
pr[||ζk||
2 ≤ ζ¯p] = pr[‖vk‖
2 ≤ v¯p] = p, (15)
for some constants ζ¯p, v¯p ∈ R>0, i.e.,
Rpα :=
{
ek ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣ e1 = 0,ek, δk, vk satisfy (13)-(15),
}
. (16)
By restricting the probabilities in (15), we are delimiting the
support of the attack and noise sequences to compact sets.
Then, the p-probable hidden reachable sets correspond to the
trajectories of the system when the driving random sequences
are restricted to satisfy A¯ = A and (15). For delimited vk and
δk, we can characterize reachable sets using deterministic
tools. In general, it is analytically intractable to compute
Rpα exactly. Instead, using LMIs, for some positive definite
matrix Ppα ∈ R
n×n, we derive outer ellipsoidal bounds of
the form Epα := {ek ∈ R
n|eTkP
p
αek ≤ 1} containing R
p
α.
Remark 1 Note, from (14), that if for some k = k∗, ek∗ 6=
0 and ρ[F ] > 1, where ρ[·] denotes spectral radius, then
||ek|| diverges to infinity as k → ∞ for any non-stabilizing
ζk. That is, Rpα is unbounded if the system is open-loop
unstable. If ρ[F ] ≤ 1, then ||ek|| may or may not diverge to
infinity depending on algebraic and geometric multiplicities
of the eigenvalues with unit modulus of F (a known fact from
stability of LTI systems), see [21] for details.
Given Remark 1, in what follows, we consider open-loop
stable systems (ρ[F ] < 1). The following result is used to
compute the ellipsoidal bounds Epα.
Lemma 1 [25] Let ξk ∈ Rn, ξ1 = 0, Vk := ξTk Pξk, for
some positive definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, and ωTk ωk ≤ ω¯,
ω¯ ∈ R>0. If there exists a constant b ∈ (0, 1) such that
Vk+1 − bVk −
1− b
ω¯
ωTk ωk ≤ 0, ∀ k ∈ N, (17)
then, Vk = ξ
T
k Pξk ≤ 1.
B. Case 1: p ∈ [0, 1−A]
Because the attack sequence is restricted to satisfy (13),
we start computing the ellipsoidal bounds corresponding to
p = 1 − A, i.e., E1−Aα . It is easy to verify using Lemma 1
that Epα ⊆ E
1−A
α for p ∈ [0, 1−A] because ζ¯p ≤ ζ¯1−A = α
and v¯p ≤ v¯1−A in (15); i.e., all p-probable ellipsoidal bounds
for p ∈ [0, 1 −A] lie within the 1 −A-probable ellipsoidal
bound. It follows that Rpe ⊆ E
1−A
α for p ∈ [0, 1−A], i.e., for
p in this interval, we only need to compute the ellipsoidal
bound corresponding to p = 1−A. Characterizing p-probable
sets for small p values is of little interest because they do not
provide a informative bound on system trajectories (since the
smaller p is, the more trajectories lie outside the p-probable
ellipsoidal bound). We work with the data available in this
setting, namely the number of alarms raised by the detector,
to bound the most informative p = 1−A probable reachable
set; in Case 2, we extend these results for larger p values.
Theorem 1 For given system matrix F , observer gain L,
residual covariance matrix Σ, and false alarm rate A,
consider the set R1−Aα in (16). If there exists a positive
definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n and b ∈ (0, 1) satisfying the
following matrix inequality:

bP FTP 0 0 0 0
PF P P −PLΣ
1
2 0 0
0 P 1−b
ω¯
I 0 0 0
0 −Σ
1
2LTP 0 1−b
ω¯
I 0 0
0 0 0 0 I 0
0 0 0 0 0 I


≥ 0; (18)
for ω¯ = α + v¯1−A; then, R1−Aα ⊆ E
1−A
α with P
1−A
α = P ,
i.e., the (1−A)-probable hidden reachable set is contained
in the ellipsoid E1−Aα = {ek ∈ R
n|eTkP
1−A
α ek ≤ 1}.
Proof : For a positive definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n, consider
the function Vk := e
T
kPek, then, from (16), inequality (17)
takes the form:
= −ϑTk

bP − FTPF FTPLΣ
1
2 −FTP
Σ
1
2LTPF 1−b
ω¯
I − Σ
1
2LTPLΣ
1
2 Σ
1
2LTP
−PF PLΣ
1
2
1−b
ω¯
I − P

ϑk
=: −ϑTkQeϑk ≤ 0,
where ϑ := (eTk , ζ
T
k , v
T
k )
T . The above inequality is satisfied
if and only if Qe ≥ 0. Matrix Qe can be written as the
Schur complement of a higher dimensional matrixQ′e; hence,
Qe ≥ 0↔ Q′e ≥ 0, i.e.,
Qe ≥ 0↔
Q′e :=


bP 0 0 FTP 00
0
1−b
ω¯
I 0 −Σ
1
2LTP 00
0 0
1−b
ω¯
I P 00
PF−PLΣ
1
2 P P 00
0 0 0 0 I 0
0 0 0 0 0I


≥ 0.
(19)
Finally, inequality (18) follows from (19) by a simple re-
ordering of rows and columns.The result follows now from
Lemma 1 by taking P1−Aα = P and ω¯ = α+ v¯1−A. 
The result in Theorem 1 provides a tool for computing
ellipsoidal bounds on R1−Aα . To make the bounds most
useful, we next construct ellipsoids with minimal volume,
i.e., the tightest possible ellipsoid bounding R1−Aα . In this
case, we have to minimize detP−1 subject to (18) (because
detP−1 is proportional to the volume of eTkPek = 1). This
is formally stated in the following corollary of Theorem 1,
see [19] for further details.
Corollary 1 For given matrices (F,L,Σ), false alarm rate
A, and b ∈ (0, 1), the solution P of the following convex
optimization: {
minP − log detP ,
s.t. P > 0 and (18),
(20)
for ω¯ = α + v¯1−A, minimizes the volume of the ellipsoid
E1−Aα (with P
1−A
α = P) bounding R
1−A
α .
See [26] for an example of how to solve (26) using
YALMIP.
As we now move toward redesigning L to minimize
the ellipsoids, we note that as ||L|| → 0, the volume of
E1−Aα goes to zero because the attack-dependent term in
(14), LΣ
1
2 ζk, vanishes. In other words, without any other
considered criteria, the observer gain leading to the minimum
volume ellipsoid is trivially given by L = 0. While this is
effective at eliminating the impact of the attacker, it implies
that we discard the observer altogether and, therefore, forfeit
any ability to build a reliable estimate of the system state.
If we impose a performance criteria that the observer must
satisfy in the attack-free case (e.g., convergence speed, noise-
output gain, and minimum asymptotic variance), it has to be
added into the minimization problem (26) so as to minimize
the volume of E1−Aα while still achieving the observer
performance in the attack-free case. For completeness, in
the following proposition, we provide an LMI criteria for
ensuring that the H∞ gain from the noise to the residual rk
in (8) is less than or equal to some γ ∈ R>0. Then, using
this criteria and Theorem 1, we provide a synthesis tool for
minimizing the volume of E1−Aα while ensuring a desired
H∞ performance in the attack-free case.
Proposition 2 For given matrices (F,C, L), if there exist a
positive definite matrix P ∈ Rn×n and constant γ ∈ R>0
satisfying the following matrix inequality:

P 0 0 (F − LC)TP CT
0 γ2I 0 −LTP I
0 0 γ2I P 0
P(F − LC) −PL P P 0
C I 0 0 I

 ≥ 0, (21)
then, the H∞ gain from the noise νk := (η
T
k , v
T
k )
T to the
residual rk = Cek+ηk of the estimation error dynamics (8)
is less than or equal to γ.
The proof of Proposition 2 is omitted here due to the page
limit. However, this is a standard result and details about
the proof can be found in, e.g., [9] and references therein.
In the following corollary of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2,
we formulate the optimization problem for designing the
observer gain L such that the volume of the ellipsoid E1−Aα
is minimized and a desired H∞ performance is achieved in
the attack-free case.
Corollary 2 For given system matrices (F,C), residual
covariance matrix Σ, false alarm rate A, b ∈ (0, 1), and
γ ∈ R>0, if there exist matrices P ∈ Rn×n andM ∈ Rn×m
solution to the following convex optimization:

minP,M − log detP ,
s.t. P > 0,


bP F TP 0 0 0 0
PF P P −MΣ
1
2 0 0
0 P
1−b
ω¯
I 0 0 0
0 −Σ
1
2MT 0 1−b
ω¯
I 0 0
0 0 0 0 I 0
0 0 0 0 0 I

 ≥ 0, and


P 0 0 F TP − CTMT CT
0 γ2I 0 −MT I
0 0 γ2I P 0
PF −MC −M P P 0
C I 0 0 I

 ≥ 0,
(22)
for ω¯ = α + v¯1−A; then, the observer gain L = P−1M
minimizes the volume of the ellipsoid E1−Aα (with P
1−A
α =
P) bounding R1−Aα and guarantees that the H∞ gain from
the noise νk = (η
T
k , v
T
k )
T to the residual rk of (8) is less
than or equal to γ in the attack-free case.
Proof : This follows from Theorem 1, Proposition 2, and the
linearizing change of variables M = PL. 
C. Case 2: p ∈ (1−A, 1]
Note that, for p ∈ (1 − A, 1], ζ¯p > ζ¯1−A = α according
to (15). Then, we can write ζ¯p = α + ǫp and pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤
α+ ǫp] = 1−A+ap, for some ǫp ∈ (0,∞) and ap ∈ (0,A].
To be able to compute ellipsoidal bounds, the constant ǫp
corresponding to a given probability 1−A+ap is required. If
ǫp is available, we can restrict ζk to compact sets as in Case 1.
Note, however, that the distribution of the attack sequence
δk (and thus the one of ζk) is generally unknown. Actually,
the attacker may induce any arbitrary (and possibly) non-
stationary random sequence ζk in (14) as long as A¯ = A.
Nevertheless, we can obtain bounds on ǫp using Markov’s
inequality [22] to link the statistical properties of ζk with ǫp.
This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Denote Mk := E[ζkζTk ] and µk := E[ζk].
For given false alarm rate A, probability p = 1 −A + ap,
and ap ∈ (0,A), the following is satisfied:

pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ ǫp] ∈ [1−A+ ap, 1],
for all ǫp ≥ ǫp :=
tr[Mk] + µTk µk
A− ap
− α.
(23a)
(23b)
Proof : The probability pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ ǫp] can be written as
pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α + ǫp] = 1 − pr[‖ζk‖
2
> α + ǫp]. Then, using
Markov’s inequality [22], we can write the following
pr[‖ζk‖
2 > α+ ǫp] = 1− pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ ǫp] ≤
E[‖ζk‖
2
]
α+ ǫp
.
Therefore, if ǫp satisfies E[‖ζk‖
2]/(α+ ǫp) ≤ A− ap, then
pr[‖ζk‖
2
> α+ǫp] ≤ A−ap and hence pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ǫp] ∈
[1−A+ ap, 1]. The expectation of the quadratic form ζTk ζk
is given by E[‖ζk‖
2
] = E[ζTk ζk] = tr[Mk] + µ
T
k µk [22];
then, E[‖ζk‖
2
]/(α+ ǫp) ≤ A−ap is satisfied for all ǫp ≥ ǫp
with ǫp as defined in (23b), and the assertion follows. 
Using Proposition 3, for given false alarm rate A and
probability p = 1 − A + ap ∈ (1 − A, 1], ap ∈ (0,A),
we can characterize p-probable hidden reachable sets, R˜pα,
by using the lower bounds on pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ ǫp] and ǫp in
(23). Specifically, for p > 1−A, the set R˜pα of the sequence
δk is defined as the set of ek ∈ Rn that can be reached from
e1 = 0 restricted to satisfy A¯ = A and{
pr[‖vk‖
2 ≤ v¯p] = 1−A+ ap and
ǫp = ǫp → pr[‖ζk‖
2 ≤ α+ ǫp] ∈ [1−A+ ap, 1],
(24)
for some constant v¯p ∈ R>0 and ǫp as defined in (24), i.e.,
R˜pα :=
{
ek ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣ e1 = 0,ek, ζk, vk, satisfy (13)-(14),(24),
}
. (25)
Remark 2 For a p-probable reachable set, we select ap such
that p = 1 − A + ap, then determine ǫp using (23b). Note
that, because the attacker can induce an attack sequence with
Fig. 2. Ellipsoid E1−Aα for different values of false alarm rate A.
arbitrarily large covariance Mk and mean µk, the lower
bound on ǫp, ǫp, in (23b) can be made arbitrarily large for
any ap. Therefore, if δk (and thus ζk) is only restricted to
satisfy A¯ = A, the opponent can induce arbitrarily large
reachable sets R˜pα.
Remark 2 implies that if we only monitor the alarms raised
by the detector, the attacker can inject arbitrarily large signals
in the residual sequence rk without changing the alarm rate.
Consequently, the sets R˜pα can be made arbitrarily large for
arbitrarily small ap. If we place additional assumptions on
the attacker, namely that the mean and covariance of the
attack sequence ζk are finite, the reachable sets will be
bounded by Proposition 3. In particular, if we assume the
attacker maintains the mean and covariance of the attack-free
scenario, i.e., E[ζk] = µk = 0 and E[ζkζ
T
k ] = Mk = Im,
then ǫp =
m
A−ap
−α. Hence, if in addition to imposing A¯ =
A, the attack is restricted to keep the statistical properties of
ζk in the attack-free case, i.e., µk = 0 and Mk = Im, the
reachable sets R˜pα are bounded for each ap ∈ (0,A) (because
ǫp is bounded); and therefore, in this case, we can compute
ellipsoidal bounds on R˜pα. This additional assumption could
be enforced by adding detectors that identify anomalies in
the sample mean and sample covariance of the residual. Such
detectors would force the attacker to avoid arbitrarily large
attack values in order to avoid detection by these additional
mean and covariance detectors.
As before, we characterize, for some positive definite
matrix P˜pα ∈ R
n×n, outer ellipsoidal bounds of the form
E˜pα := {ek ∈ R
n|eTk P˜
p
αek ≤ 1} containing R˜
p
α. The results
corresponding to Theorem 1, and Corollary 1 for Case 1 are
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For given false alarm rate A, probability p =
1 − A + ap, ap ∈ (0,A), threshold ǫp = ǫp =
m
A−ap
− α,
and matrices (F,L,Σ), consider the set R˜pα in (25). Then,
for given b ∈ (0, 1), if there exists a matrix P ∈ Rn×n
solution of the following convex optimization:{
minP − log detP ,
s.t. P > 0 and (18),
(26)
for ω¯ = α+ ǫp+ v¯p; then, R˜
p
α ⊆ E˜
p
α (with P˜
p
α = P) and E˜
p
α
has minimum volume, i.e., the p-probable hidden reachable
set R˜pα is contained in the minimum volume ellipsoid E
p
α =
{ek ∈ Rn|eTkP
p
αek ≤ 1}.
Fig. 3. The improvement in the (1 − A)-probable hidden reachable set
ellipsoidal bound E1−Aα , for A = 0.01, through application of Corollary 2
to design the optimal observer gain.
Fig. 4. Ellipsoidal bound E˜
p
α for different values of ap obtained using
Corollary 3.
A result for redesigning the observer gain for minimizing
the volume of the above ellipsoids, as in Corollary 2 for Case
1, can be stated in a similar manner as the corollary above;
however, this is omitted here due to the page limit.
IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
Consider the closed-loop system (3)-(4) with matrices:

F =
(
0.84 0.23
−0.47 0.12
)
, G =
(
0.07
0.23
)
, C =
(
1 0
)
,
L =
(
1.16
−0.69
)
, R1 =
(
0.45 −0.11
−0.11 0.45
)
,
R0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, R2 = 1, Σ = 3.26.
(27)
We start with Case 1. Using Proposition 2, the observer
gain L is designed such that the H∞ gain from the noise
to the residual rk of (8) is less than or equal to γ =
1.86 in the attack-free case. Consider the false alarm rates
A = {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20} and the corresponding α =
{6.63, 3.84, 2.70, 1.64}, obtained using Proposition 1. The
thresholds v¯1−A in (15) are computed such that pr[‖vk‖
2 ≤
v¯1−A] = 1−A. Because the entries on the diagonal of R1 are
equal and vk ∼ N (0, R1), the random sequence ‖vk‖
2
, k ∈
N follows a gamma distribution, Γ(κ, θ), with shape param-
eter κ = 1 and scale parameter θ = 0.90, see [22]. It follows
that, for these A, v¯1−A = {4.14, 2.69, 2.07, 1.44}. For these
values of v¯1−A and α, in Figure 2, we depict the ellipsoidal
bounds E1−Aα on the (1−A)-probable hidden reachable sets
R1−Aα obtained using Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Next, for
A = 0.01, using Corollary 2, we redesign the observer gain
L to minimize the volume of E1−Aα while maintaining the
H∞ performance below γ = 1.86. The obtained optimal
ellipsoidal bound, E1−Aα , is depicted in Figure 3 for the
optimal observer gain L = (0.1272,−0.0160)T . For Case
2, let A = 0.05, p = 1 − A + ap, ap = {0.01, 0.03},
and L as in (27); then, the corresponding v¯p are v¯p =
{2.8970, 3.5208} and the ǫp, computed through (23), are
given by ǫp = {21.16, 46.16}. In Figure 4, we show the
ellipsoidal bounds E˜pα on the reachable sets R˜
p
α obtained
using Corollary 3.
Remark 3 Many numerical results considering hidden at-
tacks with different distributions are presented in the accom-
panying paper [27] (Section 4). Also, extensive Monte-Carlo
simulations showing the tightness of the bounds presented
here are given in [27].
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, for a class of discrete-time LTI systems
subject to sensor/actuator noise, we have provided tools for
quantifying and minimizing the negative impact of sensor
attacks on the estimation error dynamics performance given
how the opponent accesses the dynamics (i.e., through the
controller by tampering with sensor measurements). We
have proposed to use the reachable set as a measure of
the impact of an attack given a chosen detection method.
For given system dynamics and attack detection scheme,
we have derived ellipsoidal bounds on these reachable sets
using LMIs. Then, we have provided synthesis tools for
minimizing these bounds (minimizing thus the reachable
sets) by properly redesigning the detectors.
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